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Slaight: The Effect of Lack of Jurisdiction

MONTANA LAW REVIEW
THE EFFECT OF LACK OF JURISDICTION1
The following statement taken from a Montana case represents the doctrine, as it is generally applied by most courts, which
allows the validity of a prior judgment to be impeached in a collateral proceeding:
"If a court has no jurisdiction of the subject of an action, a judgment rendered therein does not adjudicate
anything. It does not bind the parties, nor can it thereafter be made the foundation of any right. It is a mere
nullity without life or vigor. The infirmity appearing
upon its face, its validity can be assailed on appeal or
by motion to set it aside in the court which rendered it,
or by objection to it when an effort is made to use it as
evidence in any other proceeding to establish a right.""
I.
Introduction to the Rule.
One of the earliest American decisions recognizing and applying this doctrine, that a collateral attack is always permissible
when there is a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, is
Elliott v. Peirsol. The Elliott case involved an ejectment action
brought by the heirs at law of one Sarah Elliott against Peirsol,
who claimed title to the land in question by virtue of a deed executed by James Elliott and his wife, Sarah Elliott; Peirsol set
up this deed as a defense to the action. The deed as originally
executed was defective, due to the failure of the county clerk to
recite the fact that Sarah Peirsol had consented, in a privy examination, to the conveyance; however, the defect had supposedly been corrected by a court order directing the county clerk to
amend the certificate.' After examining the Kentucky statutes
which prescribed the procedure to be followed in conveyances by
a feme covert, the Supreme Court held that the County Court
did not have the power to amend the original deed, and since the
court did not have the power to so act, it did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Therefore, the court concluded:
". .. if it [any court] act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not
'The scope of this note is confined exclusively to lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter and does not include the many problems posed by
cases involving a lack of jurisdiction over the person.
'See Evans v. Oregon Short R, R. Co. (1915), 51 Mont. 107, 112; 149 P.
715, 717.
$Elliott et al v. The Lessee of Peirsol et al (1828), 1 Pet. 328, 7 L. Ed. 164.
'To read: ". . . and the said Sarah being first examined, privily and
apart from her husband, did declare that she freely and willingly sealed
the said writing .. "
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voidable but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery
sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them.
They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered in law as trespassers.
"This distinction runs through all the cases on the subject; and it proves that the jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a subject may be inquired into
in every court when the proceedings of the former are
relied on and brought before the latter by the party
claiming the benefit of such proceedings."
The importance of this decision lies in the language used by
the court in reference to the effect of judgments where there is a
want of jurisdiction, and as an illustration of the early and complete acceptance of the rule. To be sure, there has been some
modification of the rule as stated in the Elliott case since it was
handed down in 1828,' but the same basic doctrine, supported by
the same verbage, can be found over and over again in nearly all
the decisions involving a collateral attack on a prior judgment.
Actually, it is no longer a rule, it is regarded more as a truism,
something sacrosanct. Describing the fatal effect of judgments
rendered in the absence of jurisdiction, the courts become lyrical,
they are: "coram non judice," "without force or effect," "of
no avail," "absolutely void," "nullities."
Granted the doctrine
of Elliott v. Peirsolis accepted, the question is, is there any justification for it? Is it consonant with modern legal theory? Or is
it time for a re-examination of its validity in the light of its
present application?
Today, at least where domestic judgments are involved,' the
strict rule as enunciated in the Elliott case has been modified by
the requirement that the lack of jurisdiction must affirmatively
appear from the record. That is, "The judgment or decree may
not be attacked collaterally, unless the judgment-roll in the cause
"The principal modification of the general rule is stated thusly In 49 C.
J. S. Judgments, § 421: "In order to be collateraly attacked the want
of jurisdiction must affirmatively appear on the face of the record, and
the facts showing the want of jurisdiction must be alleged." (Emphasis
supplied)
'Traditionally a more liberal rule has been practiced when dealing with
judgments rendered by a "foreign" jurisdiction. However, even the
more elastic rule, as laid down by the court in Thompson v. Whitman
(1873), 18 Wall 457, 21 L. Ed. 897, has been considerably modified by a
line of recent Supreme Court decisions, infra, note 39.
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shall show the judgment or decree to be void."' The defect may
not be shown by facts aliunde the record.!
II.
Collateral Attack of Contempt Orders
However, this is but a limitation to the rule. The only true
exception, that is, the only exception generally recognized as
such,' is that found in United States v. United Mine Workers of
America.' This case involved an appeal of a contempt order
issued by Judge Goldsborough, wherein John L. Lewis was fined
$10,000.00, and the defendant Union was fined $3,500,000.00.
The defendants contended, among other things, that inasmuch as
the district court did not have jurisdiction to render the temporary restraining order, the subsequent contempt order was also
null and void. In answer to this contention the court said:
"In the case before us, the District Court had the power
to preserve existing conditions while it was determining
its own authority to grant injunctive relief. The defendants, in making their private determination of the
law, acted at their peril. Their disobedience is punishable as criminal contempt."
And, in discussing the effect of criminal contempt, the court
further stated:
"The District Court on November 29, affirmatively decided that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was of no force in
'In re Fort Shaw Irrigation District (1927), 81 Mont. 170, 261 P. 962.
This, of course, applies only to courts of general jurisdiction. cf. 31 AM.
Jur., Judgments, § 603 et seq. ". . . However, there are cases in which
it is held that a judgment void for lack of jurisdiction may be attacked
in collateral proceedings, although its void character may not appear
from the record."
'1 FREEMAN, ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §§ 376, 377.
OThere may be found some broad statements in 3 A. L. R. 535 and in 1
FREEMAN, ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 320, to the effect that ".... a
party, at whose instance a judgment has been rendered is not entitled,
in a collateral proceedings, to contend that the judgment is invalid."
However, the cases cited as supporting this rule either do not involve
a lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action or the statements
by the courts are obiter. (Iselin v. LaCoste (C.C.A. 5th, 1945) 147 F.
(21) 791; Laird v. State (1916) 79 Tex. Crim. Rep. 129, 184 SW 810;
Matter of Morrisson (1889) 52 Hun. 102 (N.Y.) ; McDermott v. Isbell
(1854) 4 Cal. 113). The generally accepted rule is that found in Grubb
v. Public Utilities Commission; (1929) 281 U.S. 470, 74 L. Ed. 972, 50 S.
Ct. 581, wherein by dicta, the court said: "But the appellant does question that it had jurisdiction of the subject-matter-and this although
at the outset he treated that jurisdiction as subsisting and invoked its

exercise. Of course, he is entitled to raise this question notwithstanding
his prior inconsistent attitude, for jurisdiction of the subject-matter
must arise by law and not by mere consent."
-°(1949) 330 U. S. 258, 91 L. Ed. 884, 67 S. Ct. 677.
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this case and that injunctive relief was therefore authorized. Orders outstanding or issued after that date were
to be obeyed until they expired or were set aside by appropriate proceedings, appellate or otherwise. The convictions for criminal contempt intervening before that
time may stand."
The court here was faced squarely with the problem of having to choose between giving effect to the doctrine that a collateral attack may always be maintained where there is a lack of
jurisdiction, or the policy of maintaining the dignity of the court.
Although the Court had considerable difficulty in reaching the
decision," it concluded, and rightly so, that the dominant interest
to be served was that of maintaining the dignity of the court.
III.

Error in Exercise of Jurisdiction
as Distinguished from Lack of Jurisdiction
In addition to the self-imposed restriction placed upon the
doctrine, as represented by the rule that the lack of jurisdiction
must affirmatively appear on the record, and the exception to
the doctrine as found in the United Mine Workers case, there is
yet another, which is by far the most important, restriction upon
the doctrine. This restriction, or exception, is generally referred
to as the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and error in exercise of jurisdiction.' This distinction is ably characterized by
one of the leading texts in the field," as follows:
"In general, therefore, where the right of the court to assume jurisdiction of a cause and proceed to judgment depends upon the ascertaimnent of facts in pais and the
court retains jurisdiction, it thereby impliedly adjudges
that the requisite jurisdictional facts exist, and having
found such facts in favor of jurisdiction, its decision in
this respect, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption
arises in such cases, when the validity of the judgment
is attacked, that the necessary jurisdictional facts were
proven. "
"Mr. Justice Jackson joined in the "majority" opinion, written by Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson; Justice Frankfurther wrote a separate concurring
opinion; Justices Black and Douglas concurred in part and dissented
in part with the majority opinion; Justices Murphy and Rutledge each
wrote a separate dissenting opinion. (Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice
Burton took no part in the decision.)
'The writer prefers to consider "error in exercise of jurisdiction" as an
exception to the rule, although it is not technically such and is never
referred to by the courts as an "exception."
181 FREEMAN, ON JUDMENrs (5th ed. 1925) § 350.
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Although this recognition that there is such a thing as" error
within jurisdiction" is not new to the law, ' it has received a good
deal of "development" within the past twenty odd years. As an
example of this "development" one may compare two Montana
cases, Barnes v. Montana Lumber and Hardware Company,' with
Haugan, et al. v. Yale Oil Corporation."
The Barnes case involved a collateral attack on a prior judgment foreclosing a lien on a threshing machine. In the prior proceeding there was no question but that the court had jurisdiction
over the parties and over the general class of cases as the one
presented. The controversy revolved around the interpretation
of the word "structure," as found in Sections 8339, et seq., Revised Codes of 1921, that is, whether or not a threshing machine
came within the meaning of the word "structure," as used
therein. The Court in the original action held that a lien did
in fact exist and it foreclosed the same. Unfortunately for the
defendant, who had purchased this threshing outfit from the
lienor, the Supreme Court held that the word "structure," as
used in Section 8339, did not include threshing machines and,
as a consequence, The Court in the original suit did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
The defendant contended that notwithstanding the fact a
threshing machine is not a "structure" within the meaning of
the statute, nevertheless the court in the original action had determined there was a valid lien on the property and that that
determination was not subject to collateral attack. The Court
was not impressed by the defendant's reasoning, however, and,
in refusing to recognize the District Court's determination in the
original action (that there was a valid lien on the property) as an
error within jurisdiction, stated:
"Certainly, where it affirmatively appears from the complaint that a claimant has no lien, a judgment declaring
that he has such is invalid under the doctrine announced
in the last quoted case. [Crawford v. Pierce, 56 Mont.
371, 185 Pac. 351]" It may therefore be attacked collaterally."
A seemingly opposite result was reached in the Haugan case,
"The Lessee of Grignon et al. v. Astor et al. (1844), 2 How. 319, 11 L. Ed.
283.
'(1928) 67 Mont. 481, 216 P. 335.
"(1950) 124 Mont. 1, 217 P. (2d) 1084.
"The Crawford case is a classic example of the courts' willingness to apply the doctrine where a collateral attack is not even involved. The case
was up on appeal and the issue was whether or not the complaint stated
a cause of action.
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which was an appeal from a decree quieting title to certain real
property. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows: In 1939 John
J. Sontag died testate leaving four heirs, two of whom were
minors. During the probate of the Sontag Estate the real property was sold pursuant to a court order, plaintiff here being the
ultimate purchaser. The two minor heirs, in this quiet title action, contend that they each have a one-fourth undivided interest
in the property inasmuch as the probate court did not have jurisdiction to confirm the original sale. The basis of this contention
is Section 91-3013, Revised Codes of 1947, which provides that
notice of sale must be "published in a newspaper . . . for two
weeks successively next before the day on which the sale is made
.... "It was apparent from an examination of the record that
notice, as provided for in the statute, had not been made.
The Court first determined that a sale of land in a probate
proceeding is separate from the administration of the estate and,
therefore, the jurisdiction over the sale does not arise merely by
the court having jurisdiction over the administration of the
However, since
estate, but must be independently obtained.
there had been a proper petition for the sale of the real estate
and the order to show cause was issued and served in a regular
manner jurisdiction had attached. "Therefore," the Court concluded,
...although it is conceded that the publication of notice
of sale of the real estate did not comply with the provisions of the statute, nevertheless jurisdiction having
attached, the irregularity could not be attacked in a collateral proceeding.
"A recital in the order of sale that an order to show cause
was issued and service made to the satisfaction of the
court protects a purchaser against a collateral attack
since he need not look beyond the order if made within
jurisdiction."
The above two cases, although distinguishable in some respects, are indicative of a trend designed to uphold prior judgments by declaring the jurisdictional defect an "error within
jurisdiction" rather than to call it a "lack of jurisdiction" and
thereby be forced to Tender the judgment void.'
"For an excellent discussion of this general problem, distinguishing between error within jurisdiction and lack of jurisdiction, see State ex rel
Yoke v. District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, in and for Natrona County (1925), 33 Wyo. 281, 238 P. 545, wherein the court attempts to collate the cases on the subject and set a pattern, or guide, for
future decisions. Unfortunately, the court only succeeds in pointing up
the fact that there is no sure guide, or criteria, one can follow in order
to determine Into which class a particular case will fit.
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The decision in the Haugan case is by no means the last
word on the subject, in fact, it is scarcely the first word. The
decision was somewhat timorous, it did not face the problem
squarely, and it did not go nearly as far as it could have, or should
have, gone."9 In contrast, it is refreshing to read statements
such as those contained in the United States Supreme Court decision of Stoll v. Gottlieb,' wherein a unanimous court said:
"A court does not have the power, by judicial fiat, to extend its jurisdiction over matters beyond the scope of the
authority granted to it by its creators ....

[However]

After a party has his day in court, with opportunity to
present his evidence and his view of the law, a collateral
attack upon the decision as to jurisdiction there rendered
merely retries the issue previously determined. There is
no reason to expect that the second decision will be more
satisfactory than the first."
And, further:
"..

. its [the court's] determination of it [whether the

court had jurisdiction] was the exercise of jurisdiction.
Even if that court erred in entertaining its jurisdiction,
its determination of that matter was conclusive upon the
parties before it, and could not be questioned by them or
either of them collaterally, or otherwise than on writ of
error or appeal to this court."
If we accept this distinction between error in exercise of jurisdiction and lack of jurisdiction, can it be said that there has
been no violence done the doctrine, or rationale behind the doctrine, that a judgment rendered by a court not having jurisdiction over the subject matter is void and open to contradiction or
impeachment in a collateral as well as a direct proceeding? If
"jurisdiction of the subject matter must arise by law and not by
mere consent";' and, if "the court does not have the power by
judicial fiat, to extend its jurisdiction over matters beyond the
scope of the authority granted to it by its creators";' and, if it
must be made to appear that the law has given the tribunal the
9

" Mr. Chief Justice Adair dissents; Mr. Justice Bottomly: "I dissent. It
is clear that in this state failure to publish a notice of sale of real
estate (as in this case) under the mandate of the statute is jurisdictional error."
2(1938) 305 U. S. 165, 83 L. Ed. 104, 59 S. Ct. 134. Plaintiff brought this
action in State Court (Illinois) upon a guarantee bond. Guarantor had
been previously released from any obligation on the bond by the Federal
Court in a bankruptcy proceeding (principal was the bankrupt). Plaintif was a party, to the Federal proceedings.
'See Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, note 10.
'Supra, note 20.
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power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy
before a court can render a binding judgment,' then can it be
said that a court may, under certain vague conditions, examine
the preliminary facts upon which jurisdiction depends and then,
although the requisites for jurisdiction may in fact be lacking,
determine from these facts that it has the power to hear and determine the matter before it?
Before going any further into the reasons behind this anomalous situation, however, it is well to examine at this point two
leading cases dealing with another type of judgment, which was,
until recently, deemed to have been void and subject to collateral
attack.
IV.
The Effect of Judgments
Founded Upon Unconstitutional Statutes
In 1885 the Supreme Court of the United States decided
that Extein Norton was not entitled to collect from the County
of Shelby, State of Tennessee, the sum of $29,000.00 plus interest,
which represented the face "value" of twenty-nine bonds issued
by direction of Barbour Lewis, President of the Board of County
Commissioners of Shelby County.' The validity, or invalidity,
of the bonds rested upon the authority of Mr. Lewis and his fellow
county commissioners to issue them. The commissioners had
been elected pursuant to a legislative act, which had purportedly
created the "office" of county commissioner. Shortly after the
bonds in question had been issued by the commissioners the act,
which created the office, was found to be unconstitutional.' The
court held: "As the act attempting to create the office of commissioner never became a law, the office never came into existence." Therefore, since the office never came into existence,
the commissioners could not have been de facto officers,
"... for the existence of a de facto officer, there must be
an office de jure. .

.

. Where no office legally exists, the

pretended officer is merely a usurper, to whose acts no
validity can be attached; and such, in our judgment, was
the position of the commissioners of Shelby County, who
undertook to act as the county court, which could be constitutionally held only by justices of the peace."
The basis or theory behind the decision was: "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no
'1 FREEMAN, ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 333.
2

Norton v. Shelby County (1885), 118 U. S. 425, 30 L. Ed. 178, 6 S. Ct.
1121.
2Statutes of 1867, Ch. 48, § 6 (Tenn.)
'Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heiskell, 691 (Tenn.)
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duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed. "
The language used by the court and the rationale for the
decision is reminiscent of that employed by the courts when dealing with cases involving a want of jurisdiction. And the doctrine, though not as deeply rooted in our legal history, was as
religiously followed and dogmatically stated as is the doctrine
allowing a collateral attack where a lack of jurisdiction is apparent from the record. Today, however, the Shelby County case is
important only for its historical significance; for in 1940 it was
overruled by the case of Chicot County Drainage District v.
Baxter State Bank.'
The Chicot case involved a suit by the respondent bank to
recover on fourteen $1,000.00 bonds which had been issued by the
petitioners in 1924. As a defense to this suit the petitioners
pleaded an earlier decree, which determined that under the Act of
Congress' holders of the type of bonds in question must present
their bonds within one year or else be forever barred from participating in the plan of readjustment or in the funds paid into
court. The decree in this original suit was entered in March,
1936. The Act which was relied on in the 1936 suit was subsequently held unconstitutional.'
Both the petitioner and the
respondents were parties to the original action. In overruling
the Shelby County case and in giving effect to the judgment rendered pursuant to the unconstitutional statute, the court said:
"As parties [to the suit], these bondholders had full opportunity to present any objections to the proceedings,
not only as to its regularity, or the fairness of the proposed plan of readjustment, or for the propriety of the
terms of the decree, but also as to the validity of the
statute under which the proceeding was brought and the
plan put into effect. Apparently no question of validity
was raised and the cause proceeded to decree on the assumption by all parties and the court itself that the
statute was valid. There was no attempt to review the
decree. If the general principles governing the defense
of res judicata are applicable, these bondholders, having
the opportunity to raise the question of invalidity were
not the less bound by the decree because they failed to
raise it. [Citing bases] "
(1939) 308 U. S.271, 84 L. Ed. 239, 60 S. Ct. 231.
48 Stat. at L. 798, Ch.345.
"Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District, (1936), 298
U.S. 513, 80 L. Ed. 1309, 56 S. Ct. 84.
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And in conclusion:
"The remaining question is simply whether respondents,
having failed to raise the question in the proceeding to
which they were parties and to which they could have
raised it and had it finally determined, were privileged
to remain quiet and raise it in a subsequent suit. Such
a view is contrary to the well-settled principles that res
judicata may be pleaded as a bar, not only as respect
matters actually presented to sustain or defeat the right
asserted in the earlier proceeding, 'but also as respects
any other available matter which might have been presented to that end.' (Emphasis supplied) Grubb v.
Public Utilities Commission, 281 U. S. 470, 74 L. Ed. 972,
50 Sup. Ct. 374, supra; Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U.
S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 195, supra."
The Chicot case is truly a landmark decision. The court was
faced squarely with the problem of having to decide whether to
continue to give life and vigor to an outmoded and undesirable
doctrine, which was based on neither reason nor sound public
policy, but which had been irresponsibly followed for sixty-four
years, or to frankly overrule it in the interest of preserving the
integrity of the court and the sound principles of res adjudicata.
In choosing the second alternative, The Court, no matter what
its motives might have been,' went a long way toward eliminating
the manly art of gamesmanship from the judicial process.
However, despite the analogy, in history, in rationale, and
in effect of the two doctrines, if anyone in 1939 dared hope that
the Supreme Court of the United States would take the next
logicaj step and strike down any attempt to collaterally attack a
judgment or decree of a "proceeding to which they were party
and in which they could have raised it and had it finally determined" their hopes would have been short lived. For on the
same day the Chicot case was decided, the court rendered justice
to Mr. Ernest Newton Kalb.' In March, 1933, defendants began
foreclosure proceedings on Mr. Kalb's farm; judgment of foreclosure was entered by the Walworth County Court in April of
that same year. After the farm had been sold Kalb filed his
petition in the bankruptcy court for composition and extension
of time to pay his debts, as provided for by the Frazier-Lemke
Act.' While this petition was pending in the Federal Court, the
County Court granted the mortgagee 's motion for confirmation
'0Boskey & Braucher, JuRIsDICrIoN & COLLATERAL ATTAcK, OcTos;n TEEm,
1939, 40 COLO. L. REv. 1006, 1007 (1940).
'Kalb v. Feuerstein (1939), 308 U. S. 433, 84 L. Ed. 370, 60 S. Ct. 343.
11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (5).
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of the sheriff's sale. (No stay of the foreclosure action or of the
subsequent action to enforce it was ever sought or granted in the
state or bankruptcy court.) The Supreme Court determined
that the policy behind The Act" was to make an" easily accessible
statutory means for rehabilitating distressed farmers, who, as
victims of a general economic depression, were without means to
engage in formal court litigation."
And that by The Act
"... Congress has vested in the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction over farmer-debtors and their property, and has by its Act
withdrawn from all other courts all power under any circumstances to maintain and enforce foreclosure proceedings against
them, its Act is the supreme law of the land which all courtsState and Federal-must observe." Therefore, "the action of
the Walworth County Court [in foreclosing the mortgage] was
not merely erroneous, but was beyond its power, void and subject
to collateral attack."
Granted that to have held otherwise in the Kalb case would
have to some extent circumvented the intent of Congress," nevertheless it is submitted that the court would have done a great
deal more for the cause of justice had it applied some of the
maxims it laid down in the Chicot case.'
V.
Limitations Imposed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause
There is a line of Supreme Court decisions, represented by
Thompson v. Whitman, Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, Baldwin
v. Iowa State Traveling Mens Association, Coe v. Coe and Sherrer
v. Sherrer,' which, taken together, dramatically illustrate the
changing approach of the Supreme Court of the United States
to the doctrine of allowing a collateral attack on a judgment of a
sister state. The cases are all the more significant in that they
involve a conflict of laws problem and a construction of the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution; for it had long been
RsId.

'4However, if the intent of Congress was to afford relief to farmers who
"were without means to engage in formal court litigation," this decision,
which allows and encourages a separate and collateral attack to be
brought up through the United States Supreme Court, would not seem to
further that policy or intent.
'5Although one may criticise the result of the Kalb case, it must be admitted that the Supreme Court was justified in holding as it did, once it
decided that the primary interest to be served was that which was represented by The Act. In this connection see infra, note 41.
8(1874) 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. Ed. 897; (1916) 244 U, S. 25, 61 L. Ed. 966,
37 S. Ct. 492; (1922) 287 U. S. 156, 77 L. Ed. 231, 63 S. Ct. 35; (1948)
334 U. S. 378, 92 L. Ed. 1064, 68 S. Ot. 1094, 1 A.L.R. (2d) 1376; (1948)
334 U. S. 343, 92 L. Ed. 1429, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 1 A.L.R. (2d) 1355.
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held that the full faith and credit clause did not prohibit a relitigation of the jurisdictional facts found by the court in the
first forum when the judgment was relied on by one of the parties
in, a subsequent action brought in the second forum.
Mr: Justice Bradley, who spoke for the court in the Thompson case, realized that he was "making law' " and indicated that
the rule of the case might appear to conflict with a very basic
doctrine: "Public policy and the dignity of the courts are supposed to require that no averrment shall be admitted to contradict the record. But as we have seen, that rule has no extraterritorial force." However, The Court did not feel compelled
to do more than pay lip service to the "Public policy and the
dignity of the courts," in sustaining collateral attacks on foreign
judgments, until the Baldwin case was before it.
The Baldwin case involved a collateral attack on a prior Missouri judgment-the defendant had appeared in that action specially for the purpose of quashing the return, setting aside the
service and dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction. This
motion was overruled by the trial court and the defendant did
not make any further appearance. The Supreme Court first determined that even if it could be shown that the person served
with process in the Missouri action was in fact not an agent of
the corporation, there was no denial of due process because "...
there is involved in that doctrine [due process] no right to litigate the same question twice."
Upon disposing of the question of due process it then directed
its attention to the principle issue, the conclusiveness of the first
forum's record in respect to the matter of jurisdiction. In refusing to allow a re-litigation of the jurisdictional facts, the court
said:
" Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation;
that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by
the result of the contest, and that matters once tried
shall be considered forever settled as between the parties.
We see no reason why he should not, in the absence of
fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the
tribunal to which he has submitted his cause."
The decision in the Sherrer case apparently removes this
implied limitation contained in the Baldwin decision, that is, that
the issue of jurisdiction must be actually litigated before it is res
'"But it must be admitted that no decision has ever been made on the
precise point involved in the case before, in which evidence was admitted
to contradict the record as to jurisdictional facts asserted therein, and
especially as to facts stated to have been passed upon by the court,"

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/5

12

Slaight: The Effect of Lack of Jurisdiction

MONTANA LAW .REVIEW
adjudicata. The rule, as it is generally recognized today, is "that
the requirement of full faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in
the courts of a sister state when there has been participation by
the defendant in the divorce proceedings, where the defendant
has been accorded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional
issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to such collateral
attack in the courts of the state which rendered the decree.
"
(Emphasis supplied)
Although, as previously indicated, the above cases represent
doctrines applicable to the field of conflicts of laws which usually
involve problems of jurisdiction over the person, as distinguished
from jurisdiction over the subject matter, nevertheless they
represent a trend that cannot be denied and one that has had
considerable impact on this whole problem of collateral attack.'
VI.
Conclusion
The requirement that the one attacking a prior judgment
may not go, beyond the record (that is, that he may not show by
facts aliunde the record that the original court was lacking in
jurisdiction) ; the sustaining of a contempt order rendered by a
court for a violation of its temporary restraining order, even
when the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the original
suit; and the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and error
within jurisdiction are all examples of whittling away at one
doctrine and giving effect to another dominate doctrine. In spite
of the somewhat apologetic language sometimes used when applying the above limitations and the facts that even when applying these limitations the courts stoutly maintain they are all
the while adhering to the rule that "a judgment rendered by a
court lacking jurisdiction is void," the mere fact that the limitations are applied is, in itself, a tacit admission that there is no
sound basis for the rule. For if this lack of jurisdiction, or
power, is what is behind the doctrine, then can it be said that
even though there is in fact a lack of jurisdiction it is in some way
cured because the defect does not appear on the record, or because the type of proceeding involved is of a unique nature, or
because the court in the original action had already determined,
although admittedly erroneously determined, that they did have
"Sherrer v. Sherrer (1948) 334 U. S. 343, 92 L. Ed. 1429, 68 S. Ct. 1087,
1 A.L.R. (2d) 1355.

"See In re Estrem's Estate (1940), 107 P. (2d) 36, 16 Cal. (2d) 563.
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NOTES AND COMMENT
jurisdiction? Clearly the rule is not an absolute rule, something
that has been and is to be applied rigidly in every instance; it is
submitted that there are good reasons for abolishing it.
After all, the problem is one of balancing the public interests
involved. Weighing against the rule are the public interests in
maintaining the dignity of the courts, bringing litigation to an
end, and requiring that one present all his defenses in one action.
Little can be said for the rule, it would seem, except that it is old
and cherished.
In overruling the Shelby County case, Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, th author of the Chicot decision, said:
"The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects
...Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, or prior determinations deemed to have finality,
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and its previous application, demand examination . . . and it is manifest

from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement
of a principle of, the absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
This statement of the Supreme Court is equally applicable in
dealing with the analogous cases of judgments which are supposedly void ab initio due to a want of jurisdiction. Are there
not "rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute
[judgment] and of its previous application" involved when dealing with prior judgments as well as when dealing with statutes?
Are solemn judicial declarations, where both parties are either
actually or constructively before the court,' entitled to less recognition, to be placed on a lower plane, than legislative declarations? One may not sit idly by and fail to challenge the validity
of a statute under which his rights and duties are supposedly
being determined, and then expect to be able to challenge it at a
later date and thereby nullify all of those rights and duties which
have become vested under the operation of the statute; why
should not the same conclusive effect be given to judgments?
It is well settled that one may not collaterally attack a prior
judgment by an allegation that the complaint or testimony on
" 0This note does not, of course, contemplate attacks by strangers to the
action whose rights have bee affected, but who were not actually parties or privies to the original suit.
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which the judgment is based are false; or upon the grounds that
the court erred in determining the law or facts of the original
action. Why, then, should the courts allow a collateral attack on
the ground that there was a lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter in the original action ?" In both instances the attacking
party has had his day in court and has presumably had ample opportunity to raise all of his defenses. Established principles designed to protect the rights of parties and govern the orderly
judicial process indicate that the rule that a judgment rendered
by a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter is wholly
void and subject to collateral attack should be struck down once
and for all. "
A. F. SLAIGHT
"Of course, if the court rendering the original judgment was barred by
the Constitution or by the supreme law of the land from assuming jurisdiction of the action, then a collateral attack may be permissible and
necessary, depending upon the circumstances, e. g., Pennoyer v. Neff
(1877), 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565; supra, note 32.

42

To bring about this desired result it would require, in addition to an
overruling of the earlier decisions, legislative acton. In this connection,
see R. C. M. 1947, §§ 93-1001-20, 93-1001-28 and 93-1001-29.

VENUE OF CONTRACTS ACTIONS IN MONTANA
In 1944 the Hardenburgh' case overturned settled law in
Montana on the fundamental procedural question of the place of
trial of actions on contracts. That the question is one which is
still very much alive is evidenced by the recent decision of Fraser
v. Clark,' wherein one of the dissenting justices said:
"Nothing said in the majority opinion tends to reduce the confusion that exists on the subject. It merely
disposes of the present controversy and in my judgment
lends no help to the lawyer who may find himself confronted with questions of venue in the future."
Part I of this comment is a survey of the salient Montana
cases on this subject of venue of contract actions, including the
Hardenburghand Fraser cases. Part II is an appraisal of the
present state of Montana law on the matter. Part III is a critique
of what would seem to be the present rule. Suggestions for
change of the present rule are made in part IV.
'Hardenburgh, v. Hardenburgh (1944) 115 Mont. 469, 146 P.(2d) 151.
2(1954) ......
Mont ......
273 P.(2d) 105.
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